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ABSTRACT 
Party Cues and Yardstick Voting  
by Benny Geys and Jan Vermeir 
Politicians within any given party generally exhibit a degree similarity in terms of 
(political) viewpoints. Moreover, they are often constrained to follow general 
party lines on certain policy issues.  Finally, they may be more likely to mimic 
one another than politicians from another party. Hence, parties provide 
important cues on how politicians will act once elected.  The present paper 
assesses the implications of such party cues for the traditional model of 
yardstick voting (where voters use what they observe in neighbouring 
jurisdictions to judge the performance of their incumbent). It is shown that the 
information content of what happens in neighbouring jurisdictions differs 
depending on whether or not the same party governs this jurisdiction. More 
specifically, we find that voters might still take neighbouring jurisdictions into 
account, but should distinguish between jurisdictions where the same or a 
different party is in power. The results of the model are in line with recent 
empirical observations in Sweden and the United States. 
 
Keywords: Yardstick voting, spatial interaction, party labels, party cues  
JEL Classification: D72, H30, H77 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Parteien und 'Yardstick'-Wählen 
Politiker einer beliebigen Partei zeigen gewöhnlich Ähnlichkeiten bezüglich 
(politischer) Ansichten. Zudem sind sie in bestimmten Politikfeldern oft abhän-
gig von Grundsätzen ihrer Partei. Letztlich übernehmen sie Standpunkte eher 
untereinander als von Politikern anderer Parteien. Daher liefern Parteien wichti-
ge Hinweise wie Politiker nach ihrer Wahl handeln werden. Das vorliegende 
Papier beurteilt die Auswirkungen solcher Informationen über die Partei auf das 
bekannte „Yardstick Voting“ Modell (Wähler nutzen ihre Beobachtungen aus 
benachbarten Regionen zur Beurteilung ihrer eigenen Regierung). Es wird ge-
zeigt, dass der Informationsgehalt der Ereignisse in Nachbarregionen stark da-
von abhängt, ob dieselbe Partei die Regierung stellt. Genauer gesagt, Wähler 
können andere Regionen bei ihren Entscheidungen berücksichtigen, jedoch 
sollten sie zwischen solchen mit derselben und mit einer anderen Partei in der 
Regierungsverantwortung differenzieren. Die Ergebnisse des Modells decken 
sich mit jüngsten Beobachtungen in Schweden und den Vereinigten Staaten. 
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1. Introduction 
Both economists and political scientists have stressed that political parties tend to 
develop a reputation for particular policy positions (e.g., Wittman, 1989, 1995; Aldrich, 
1995; Jones and Hudson, 1998; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Müller, 2000). As a 
consequence, the party's name becomes a cue for the policy decisions its politicians (or 
‘members’) are likely to resort to once elected, and thus – in marketing terms – can be 
seen as a 'brand name'. Once established, these party brand names provide low-cost 
information to voters about the politicians associated with these parties (see Snyder and 
Ting, 2002, 2003 and references therein). Specifically, they indicate to the voter “how 
the coalition of its members will behave” (Wittman, 1995, 21). Membership of a given 
party is therefore “one of the signals that voters use when estimating the 'quality' of 
political representatives” (Jones and Hudson, 1998, 187; see also Caillaud and Tirole, 
2002; Poutvaara and Takalo, 2007).   
 
Party brand names not only provide valuable cues about politicians to voters, but may 
also lead politicians to self-select into parties that share their preferences. Reversely, 
political parties may use “screening mechanisms to select candidates with fairly 
homogeneous personality traits” (Jones and Hudson, 1998, 184). Both elements serve to 
reinforce the similarity or “cohesion” in terms of (political) viewpoints that exists 
between politicians belonging to the same party (Hazan, 2003, 1). Finally, the need to 
preserve the strength of the brand name – which may be important for electoral 
considerations – creates strategic incentives for and instils constraints on party members 
(especially for those pursuing a political career within the party) (e.g., Caillaud and 
Tirole, 2002; Crutzen, 2004). That is, politicians are often required to follow party lines 
on certain issues. Such party discipline makes that “parties matter, even once 
preferences have been taken into account” (Hazan, 2003, 1). 
 
While all this does not mean that parties are unitary actors in which any politician is a 
mirror-image (or perfect substitute) of the other politicians of the party (as commonly 
assumed in early Political Economy models such as Downs, 1957; Barro, 1973; 
Ferejohn, 1986) it does imply that politicians within any given party are to some extent 
interchangeable and tend to follow similar policies.1  Obviously, other arguments could 
be proposed to explain this correspondence between the policies of politicians within 
the same party.  While we do not intend to list all of them here, two are worth 
mentioning more explicitly.  First, it is easier for politicians of the same party to collude 
and form a political ‘cartel’.  Such collusion will, similar to the arguments above, 
induce similarity in policies pursued by politicians of the same party.  Second, one 
could argue that politicians of the same party are more likely to engage in a ‘mimicking’ 
of each other’s policies, even when they are not made to follow the same policies 
through party discipline.  The reason is that they (inherently) feel drawn to the same 
                                                 
1  Ashworth et al. (2006) and Foucault et al. (2007), among others, find supportive empirical evidence 
for the contention that politicians of the same party are more likely to take similar decisions.  The 
former analyse the diffusion of an environmental tax across the Flemish municipalities between 1990 
and 1999 and show that “the closer is the ideology of those authorities that have adopted the tax to 
the ideology of a given authority, the more likely it is that the authority will adopt the tax” (Ashworth 
et al., 2006, 242).  The latter assess public spending interactions in France over the period 1983-2002 
and uncover that “when facing a common shock, incumbents with the same partisan affiliation react 
in the same way in terms of primary, operating and investment expenditure” (Foucault et al., 2007, 
16). 
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policies as well as are able to obtain more information on the content and 
implementation strategy of particular policies from other party members.2 
 
This paper analyses the consequences of such 'party effects' in a model of yardstick 
voting. Previous theoretical models of yardstick voting (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995; 
Revelli, 2002) argue that voters – being imperfectly informed about the competency 
and/or honesty of their government – can benefit from an informational spill-over 
induced by what happens in neighbouring jurisdictions. This use of neighbouring 
jurisdictions as a yardstick enables them, under certain conditions, to learn more about 
their own incumbent's quality (e.g., Salmon, 1987, 2005; Besley and Case, 1995). 
However, despite the clear structuring importance of political parties in real life, 
partisanship is completely ignored in previous models of this kind (Revelli, 2006, 
conjectures about the potential importance of politics in models of yardstick voting but 
does not rigorously follow up on this idea). The present paper takes a first step to 
address this issue and shows that allowing for partisan effects entails that the use of 
neighbouring jurisdictions as a yardstick is no longer straightforward. The reason is that 
the information content of what occurs in neighbouring jurisdictions varies when 
incumbents are from the same or different parties. Specifically, our model indicates that 
high taxation levels in neighbouring jurisdictions have a positive effect on the 
incumbent's vote when the neighbouring jurisdiction is governed by a politician from a 
different party. When the incumbents in both jurisdictions are from the same party, 
however, taxation levels in neighbouring jurisdictions can have a positive or negative 
effect on the vote (or no effect at all). Hence, a distinction should be made between 
neighbouring jurisdictions based on whether the same or a different party is in power. 
These findings are in line with recent empirical observations on voting in Swedish 
municipalities (Ågren, 2005) and the United States (Johnson, 2006). 
 
2. The model 
To facilitate comparisons with the existing literature, we adapt the model of yardstick 
voting brought forward by Revelli (2002). We focus on a setting with two parties and 
two jurisdictions (i and j), which are each others' neighbours.3 While most of the 
empirical spatial econometrics literature defines neighbourliness in a purely 
geographical sense (Brueckner, 2003; Geys, 2006; Van Parys and Verbeke, 2007), our 
theoretical approach allows for more general definitions (e.g. based on similarity in 
socio-economic characteristics; see Baicker, 2005). The incumbent government in each 
jurisdiction is responsible for the provision of a purely local public good. While 
interjurisdictional spillovers have been advanced as a possible explanation of spatial 
patterns in fiscal policies (see, e.g., Kelejian and Robinson, 1993; Solé-Ollé, 2006; 
Werck et al., 2008), the present model assumes the absence of such spillovers. A similar 
assumption was introduced by, among others, Revelli (2002) and allows us to study the 
spatial interactions that emerge solely as a consequence of an informational spillover 
between jurisdictions. 
                                                 
2  We are grateful to Daniel Sturm and Ivo Bischoff, respectively, for suggesting these alternatives. 
3  The introduction of multiple neighbours makes the model less tractable as, for example, appropriate 
spatial weights should be assigned to the various neighbours.  Hence, we limit ourselves to the simple 
set-up with only two jurisdictions to more clearly illustrate the effect of party cues (cfr. Revelli, 2002; 
Rork, 2003).  Still, clearly, adding additional jurisdictions is one potential extension to our simple 
model – and the ensuing need for adequate weighing schemes is obviously of crucial importance in 
empirical applications. 
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The cost – in terms of taxation – of the local public good (c) is determined by three 
elements.4  The first is the price at which the local government buys this good at the 
national market (p). This price is common knowledge and, for simplicity, assumed 
constant over time. The second element is a cost shock specific to each jurisdiction (θ ). 
This is a stochastic variable over which the local government has no control and which 
is taken from an unbounded normal distribution with E(θ ) = 0 and Var(θ ) = 2θσ  (these 
shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated over time). Finally, the cost of the local public 
good is influenced by the politician’s inherent ‘quality’ (which affects the policies the 
incumbent implements, the approach she takes towards provision of the public good, 
and so on). These policies can increase or decrease the total cost of the public good with 
a value q, whereby q is drawn from an unbounded normal distribution with E(q) = 0 and 
Var (q) = 2qσ  (crucial in our model is that this candidate ‘quality’ is not iid, as discussed 
more explicitly below).5  Hence, we can write the cost of the public good in jurisdiction 
i at time t as: 
 
 iitit qpc −+= θ  (1) 
Given that voters only observe the total cost of public goods provision (cit) and the 
national market price p, they are unable to differentiate between the effect of cost 
shocks and that of the politician’s quality. Yet, if cost shocks in jurisdictions i and j are 
positively correlated (i.e. 0),( >= jtitcorr θθρ ), information about the cost of local 
public goods in neighbouring jurisdictions helps to uncover the ‘quality’ of one’s own 
incumbent (since it provides some information on whether this politician’s approach to 
public good provision increased or decreased the total cost c). This correlation is crucial 
to previous models of yardstick voting. Indeed, if cost shocks are not correlated, nothing 
can be gained by looking at neighbouring jurisdictions (Besley and Case, 1995; Revelli, 
2002). 
 
Still, as argued above, politicians of the same political party are likely to have similar 
preferences (Hazan, 2003) and be relatively homogeneous due to party's screening of 
candidate members (Jones and Hudson, 1998). Moreover, they might have an incentive 
to follow party guidelines (e.g., Jones and Hudson, 1998; Caillaud and Tirole, 2002; 
Crutzen, 2004) or be more easily able to ‘collude’ with neighbours’ incumbents when 
these are from the same party. These features imply that politicians are likely to 
implement similar policies (with comparable consequences in terms of the cost of the 
public good provided) when they are from the same party. In terms of the present 
model, this implies that, as mentioned above, q is not iid.  More specifically, this 
partisan effect can be modelled by assuming a joint probability distribution in which the 
q’s of politicians of the same party have a positive correlation (whereas the q’s of 
politicians from different parties are independent). That is, the quality of a politician of 
party A in jurisdiction i and a politician of party A in jurisdiction j follows a joint 
                                                 
4  Note that the provision of public goods is normalised to one (cfr. Besley and Case, 1995). Hence, 
lower cost of provision can be interpreted as higher government efficiency. 
5  Politician’s ‘quality’ is exogenous in our model. This contrasts to recent efforts attempting to explain 
the (lack of) competence and honesty of elected officials using a citizen-candidate framework (e.g., 
Besley, 2004; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Messner and Pollborn, 2004; Poutvaara and Takalo, 2007) 
and endogenizing quality might provide an interesting extension to future research. 
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normal distribution with mean 0, standard deviation 2qσ  and positive covariance. 
Representing this correlation between politicians in a given party as η , we thus assume 
that 0>η when politicians are of the same party while 0=η when they belong to 
different parties.6  As the draws of q for politicians from the same party therefore are 
not fully independent (though these draws are independent across parties), we introduce 
some form of cross-jurisdictional political path-dependence into the yardstick voting 
model.  
 
Compared to the 'standard' model of yardstick voting (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995; 
Revelli, 2002), the presence of a correlation in the behavior of politicians from the same 
party implies that two cases should be distinguished: incumbents in the two jurisdictions 
are from the same party or incumbents in both jurisdictions are from different parties. 
Before we turn to the analysis of these two cases, let us consider the timing of the 
model. At the beginning of period t, a government is established in both jurisdictions. 
Given that we focus on a two-period model, these are new governments (i.e. they have 
not been in office in a previous term and no historical information is available about 
them).7  Then, a cost shock materializes and voters observe the realisations of the total 
cost of public good provision in both jurisdictions (cit and cjt respectively). They use this 
information to update their beliefs about their incumbent (i.e. about the value of q) (and, 
if possible, the opposition candidate). The (ex post) conditional expectation of q given 
the outcomes observed in the first period (i.e. E(q| cit, cjt) is then a weighted average of 
the ex ante mean of quality (here assumed to be 0) and period 1 costs of public goods 
provision (in both jurisdictions) – with the weight on the latter term depending on the 
relative variance of quality and the random shock (θ ) (see also Meyer and Vickers, 
1997, for a similar approach in a different setting). Based on these updated beliefs, they 
decide to re-elect their current incumbent or to replace him/her by an opposition 
candidate. 
 
CASE 1: Incumbents in both jurisdictions are from the same party 
Let us assume a stochastic voting rule under which the probability that a given voter 
casts a ballot in favour of the incumbent (Sit) can be written as (see Revelli, 2002): 
 
 { }0),()(Pr 1,1, >+−= ++ itjtitI tiOtiit cccEcES α  (2) 
where E is the expectations operator, superscripts I and O refer to the incumbent and 
opposition candidate respectively and itα  is a zero mean random term that is iid across 
voters and (for mathematical convenience) follows a logistic distribution.8 
Alternatively, one might also impose a deterministic voting rule in which incumbents 
                                                 
6  An alternative way to specify this intra-party correlation is to assume that q consists of two parts: a 
politician-specific element (which can be assumed iid) and a party-specific element. We are grateful 
to Johannes Münster for this suggestion. 
7  Clearly, the model can be extended by regarding a longer time frame. This would allow for, say, the 
possibility that an incumbent's quality increases with experience (i.e. with the number of periods in 
office). We abstain from such extensions at present and concentrate on the most basic set-up to 
illustrate the effect of politicians' intra-party similarity. 
8  One might also allow for a non-zero mean of itα  to represent, for example, an incumbency advantage 
(cfr. Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Konrad, 2002; Chaturvedi and Münster, 2005; Mehlum and 
Moene, 2006).  This extension does not affect our basic findings. 
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are re-elected with probability one if the expected level of government efficiency under 
the incumbent in the next period is higher than or equal to that expected under the 
opposition candidate (and zero otherwise). However, this presumes that the voter's 
decision is solely driven by the efficiency of public service provision. This is unlikely to 
hold in reality. Hence, we rely on the stochastic approach rendered in equation (2).  
 
Essentially, equation (2) states that, for a given realisation of the random term ( itα ), any 
given voter has a higher probability of voting for the present incumbent if the 
candidate's (updated) expected cost of providing the public good – given the cost 
realisation in both jurisdictions at time t – is smaller than the expected cost under the 
opposition party's candidate. Note that multiplication of this probability of voting for the 
incumbent with the number of voters gives the expected number of votes for the 
incumbent in jurisdiction i.  Hence, this expression at the same time represents the vote 
share of the incumbent. 
 
Now, since the cost shock (θ ) and the national price of the public good (p) are 
unaffected by which party is in power, equation (2) can be reformulated as:  
 
 { }0),()(Pr <+−= itjtitIiOiit ccqEqES α  (3) 
When the incumbents in both jurisdictions are from the same party, voters have no 
additional information to update their beliefs about the opposition candidate. Hence, 
E( Oiq ) is simply the average value, which, given the assumptions above, is zero. The 
voters' updated beliefs concerning the incumbent – E( ), jtit
I
i ccq  – on the other hand can 
be written as (DeGroot, 1970, 167; see also Theil, 1971, 188-189; Meyer and Vickers, 
1997): 
 
 )()(),( pcpcccqE jtitjtit
I
i −+−= δβ  (4) 
Substituting this into equation (3) leads to: 
 
 { })()(Pr pcpcS jtititit −+−<= δβα  (5) 
As itα  follows a logistic distribution, we can rewrite Sit as (cfr. Revelli, 2002): 
 
 
[ ][ ])()(exp1 )()(exp pcpc pcpcS jtit jtitit −+−+
−+−= δβ
δβ
 (6) 
Or, after rearranging terms and taking natural logarithms: 
 
 jtittit cchs .. δβ ++=  (7) 
Whereby ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −≡ it
it
it S
Ss 1log  and ( )pht δβ +−≡ . The expected vote share of the 
incumbent thus depends both on the tax burden (or, given the normalisation of public 
goods provision in the model, the efficiency) in the own jurisdiction and that in the 
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neighbouring jurisdiction. The relative weights placed on each of these (β and δ 
respectively) can be determined through a standard application of Bayesian updating 
methods (DeGroot, 1970; Theil, 1971; Meyer and Vickers, 1997). This reveals that: 
 
 ( )21
1
κ
ηκτβ −
+−=  (8) 
 ( )21 κ
ηκτδ −
−=  (9) 
Where 22
2
θσσ
στ += q
q  is a measure of the relative variances of politicians’ quality (q) and 
the cost shock (θ).  κ can be thought of as the 'cross section' correlation between ci and 
cj (Meyer and Vickers, 1997) and equals:  
 
 ( ) ητρτκ .1 +−≡  (10) 
We are now in a position to determine how, and under which conditions, government 
efficiency in the own and neighbouring jurisdiction affects the re-election chances of the 
incumbent government. Firstly, from equation (8), it can be seen that β < 0, such that 
high cost of public goods provision in the own jurisdiction always translates in a loss of 
votes for the incumbent government (and has a negative effect on his/her probability of 
re-election). Secondly, the effect of the tax burden in neighbouring jurisdictions 
(represented by the parameter δ) is not a priori clear. The effect depends on the relative 
size of the correlations between the cost shocks in both jurisdictions (ρ) and the 
correlation between politicians of the same party (η). Essentially, there are three 
possibilities. In the first case, the correlation of the cost shocks is larger than the 
correlation between politicians within a party ( ηρ > ). From equations (9) and (10), it 
can be gauged that under this condition (δ > 0). Hence, even though politicians of the 
same party are likely to take similar actions, the neighbouring tax burden still reveals 
mostly information about the size of the cost shock. In fact, as in the 'standard' yardstick 
voting model (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995; Revelli, 2002), a high tax burden in the 
neighbouring locality suggests to voters that the cost shock was high, and therefore 
leads to a higher vote share for the incumbent in jurisdiction i. Note that when 0=η  
our model reduces to the model of Revelli (2002). In that setting, the tax burden of the 
neighbours always has a positive effect on the vote share.  
 
When ηρ < , the correlation between politicians of the same party exceeds the 
correlation in cost shocks. In this case, high costs in the neighbouring jurisdiction 
inform the voter that the incumbent in the neighbouring jurisdiction increases the cost of 
the public good. But since politicians within the same party are correlated, this indicates 
that one’s own incumbent is probably one of that same breed.  Consequently, a high 
cost in the neighbouring jurisdiction has a negative effect on the vote share for the 
incumbent. From equations (9) and (10) it follows that δ now takes on a negative value. 
In the extreme case where parties are assumed to be unitary actors in which all 
politicians are fully interchangeable (cfr. Barro, 1973; Downs, 1957; Ferejohn, 1986)9, 
                                                 
9  One might, for example, think of very strict party discipline. 
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this condition will hold with (near) certainty (since 1=<ηρ ).  Hence, in such a setting, 
high costs of the public good in the neighbouring jurisdiction certainly lead to electoral 
retribution for the incumbent. 
 
When both correlations are equal ηρ = , the tax burden in neighbouring jurisdictions is 
uninformative. It is equally likely to derive from a high (low) cost shock or a cost-
increasing of cost-decreasing behaviour of the politician in jurisdiction j. Both elements 
have opposite effects on the vote share of the incumbent in jurisdiction i and cancel 
each other out (i.e. δ = 0).  
 
CASE 2: Incumbents in both jurisdictions are from different parties 
When the incumbents in jurisdictions i and j are from different parties, the opposition 
candidate in jurisdiction i is of the same party as the incumbent in the neighbouring 
jurisdiction. Neighbours' policies then not only reveal information about the likelihood 
of a high or low cost shock, but also about the opposition candidate. Hence, compared 
to Case 1, both the expression for the expected q of the incumbent and the opposition 
candidate differ. Starting with the former, this can, as before (see equation (4)), be 
written as: 
 
 )()(),( pcpcccqE jtitjtit
I
i −+−= δβ  (11) 
However, given that incumbents are not from the same party (i.e. 0=η ), the weights 
voters attach to the information obtained from the public good's cost in both the own 
and the neighbouring jurisdiction change. More specifically, we now get that: 
 
 ( )22 11 τρ
τβ −−
−=  (12) 
 ( )( )22 11
1
τρ
ρττδ −−
−=  (13) 
The expected q of the opposition candidate is now correlated with that of the incumbent 
in the neighbouring jurisdiction (as these are from the same party and thus likely to take 
similar decisions). Hence, her expected q depends on the tax burden of the neighbouring 
jurisdiction (as well as that in the own jurisdiction). Specifically, it can be shown to 
equal: 
 
 ( ) )(.)( pcpccqE jtitjtOi −+−= λδη  (14) 
with τηλ .−=  
 
Introducing these results in equation (3) and performing appropriate rearrangements 
(see equations (6) and (7)), we obtain: 
 
 ( ) ( ) jtittit cchs λδδηβ −+−+= .  (15) 
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whereby ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −≡ it
it
it S
Ss 1log , ( )pht λδβ −+−≡ and β, δ and λ are defined as in 
equations (12), (13) and (14) respectively. Given that both τ and ρ are positive and 
smaller than one, equation (12) illustrates that β < 0. The own jurisdiction's tax burden 
again has a negative effect on the incumbent's vote share (and re-election odds). For the 
same reason, equation (13) shows that δ > 0 such that the tax burden in the neighbouring 
jurisdiction has a positive effect on the incumbent's vote share. Note, moreover, that 
when politicians of the same party become increasingly likely to follow similar policies 
(i.e. η becomes larger), a high tax burden in the neighbouring jurisdiction weighs 
heavier on the opposition candidate in the own jurisdiction (see equation (14)). This 
supplements the positive effect low efficiency in the neighbouring jurisdiction has on 
the expected quality of the own incumbent. Therefore, the positive effect of the tax 
burden in the neighbouring jurisdiction on the incumbent's vote share is stronger here 
than under case 1 
 
3. Discussion and conclusion 
Politicians within any given party are (albeit imperfect) substitutes of one another. This 
proposition is supported by the observations that: (a) politicians within any given 
political party tend to have similar policy preferences (Jones and Hudson, 1998; Hazan, 
2003), (b) they tend to be constrained by intra-party disciplining devices (Caillaud and 
Tirole, 2002; Crutzen, 2004) in order to maintain the party's reputation or brand name 
(Wittman, 1989, 1995; Jones and Hudson, 1998) and (c) politicians within the same 
party might more easily mimic one another across jurisdictions. Importantly, the 
ensuing correlation between actions of politicians of the same party has considerable 
consequences for the standard model of yardstick voting (e.g., Besley and Case, 1995; 
Revelli, 2002) where voters use neighbouring jurisdictions as a yardstick to judge the 
quality of their incumbent. In fact, the information content of what occurs in 
neighbouring jurisdictions differs depending on whether or not the same party governs 
both jurisdictions. Specifically, low efficiency (i.e. high costs for a given level of public 
goods provision) in neighbouring jurisdictions is good news for local politicians' re-
election chances only when the neighbouring jurisdiction is governed by a politician 
from a different party. When the incumbents in both jurisdictions are from the same 
party, tax levels in neighbouring jurisdictions can have a positive or negative effect on 
the incumbent's vote (or no effect at all). Hence, our results illustrate that voters should 
distinguish between jurisdictions where the same or a different party is in power.  
 
Recent empirical evidence on voter behaviour in Swedish municipalities is in line with 
this core prediction of our model. Indeed, Ågren (2005) tests whether Swedish voters 
behave differently with respect to the tax rates set in neighbouring municipalities 
depending on whether these are governed by the same or a different party. The Swedish 
setting provides an ideal case for such an analysis given that there are essentially two 
party blocs (i.e. left and right) – allowing a clear designation of the political colour of 
the local governments. The results illustrate that voters are significantly affected in their 
vote decision by neighbouring municipalities’ fiscal policies only when these are 
governed by politicians from the opposing political bloc. Policies in neighbouring 
municipalities with the same political constellation in power do not significantly affect 
election results in the ‘home’ municipality. Our model provides an explanation for such 
behaviour by arguing that – in the presence of intra-party similarities between 
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candidates – taxes in neighbouring jurisdictions are likely to be more informative about 
local politician’s quality when they are levied by the opposite political bloc.  
 
Also, focusing on gubernatorial election results in US counties over the period 1960-
2000, Johnson (2006) finds some support for our main result. Indeed, assessing tax 
revenue and tax rate changes in the US, she finds evidence for yardstick voting only 
under “mixed” political control across neighbouring jurisdictions (“mixed” in the sense 
that the political colour of the neighbouring governors differs). That is, the incumbent’s 
gubernatorial vote share is higher (lower) than what can be expected based on the 
‘average’ vote share of his/her party in the region when the tax burden decreased 
(increased) relative to neighbouring jurisdictions and the governor in the neighbouring 
jurisdiction is of the opposite political party than the one in the home jurisdiction.10 
Hence, though in general there is “only limited evidence in support of yardstick 
competition” (Johnson, 2006, 1), her findings clearly provide some evidence in line 
with the idea that party labels matter for yardstick voting. 
 
 
 
                                                 
10  One important exception is to be noted. In contrast to the results under total tax revenues and tax rate 
changes, the results for income tax liabilities in the higher income tax brackets (i.e. above $80,000) 
indicate that yardstick voting appears limited to situation where both governors are Democrat. 
Though an interesting finding and compatible with the present model, it is not immediately clear to us 
why income taxation should be different from other taxes in this respect. 
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